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No Right to Judge: Feminism and the
Judiciary in Third Republic France
Sara L. Kimble

In 1931 the Catholic feminist attorney Marie-Thérèse Moreau asked:
“Why does France not have female judges?” Her query was prompted
by a visit from Warsaw’s leading juvenile court judge, Wanda Grabinska,
who often traveled to France and spoke favorably of women’s access
to the judiciary. Grabinska was one of many women who, after World
War I, could now vote and pursue the profession of her choice. Female
judges could already be found in various countries including Poland,
Germany, Lithuania, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States. Although
France was among the first countries to graduate women from law
schools and to admit women to the bar, Frenchwomen were among the
last to enjoy equal opportunities in this profession.
At the fin de siècle Jeanne Chauvin, a doctorate in law and a lycée
teacher, attempted to open the legal profession to women by bringing
suit. The Cour de Cassation rejected her claim in 1897 and justified
Sara L. Kimble is assistant professor of history at the University of Northern Iowa. She is completing a book tentatively titled Justice Redressed: Women and the Social Uses of the Law in Modern France,
1900–1946.
	The author wishes to thank Rachel Fuchs, Sarah Hanley, Karen Offen, Lars Peterson, and
the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their helpful criticism and suggestions. The Radcliffe Institute and the University of Northern Iowa provided generous research support.
 Marie-Thérèse Moreau, “Une conférence d’une femme magistrat,” L’union nationale des
femmes, Feb. 10, 1931, 2.
 Marcelle Kraemer-Bach, “Fédération internationale des femmes avocats,” La Française,
Nov. 9, 1929; Kraemer-Bach, “L’enfance en danger moral,” La Française, Dec. 30, 1933; Wanda
Grabinska, “L’enfant devant le tribunal,” in Première assemblée générale de l’Association internationale des
juges des enfants: Journées des 26, 27, 28 et 29 juillet 1930 (Brussels, 1931), 52–69.
 Maria Vérone, “Les femmes dans la magistrature dans le monde entier,” Le droit des femmes,
Feb. 1929, 46–47. Nazis prohibited German Jews from practicing law from June 1933 on, and
all women were excluded from the profession from 1936 to 1945. The leading American female
juvenile justice reformer was Miriam Van Waters, who maintained contacts in France, especially
as a vice president of the International Association of Children’s Magistrates (Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe Institute [hereafter SL], Miriam Van Waters Papers, box 47, folder 576). See Estelle B.
Freedman, Maternal Justice: Miriam Van Waters and the Female Reform Tradition (Chicago, 1996).
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women’s exclusion from the bar and judiciary on the grounds that they
were disenfranchised and thus ineligible to serve in a “virile office.”
The independent socialist deputy René Viviani believed that women
had a right to work in the profession for which they had been trained
and so sponsored legislation to permit women to work as avocats. Under
pressure from the Ministry of Justice, Viviani’s bill did not include a
request for women’s access to the judiciary. His colleagues agreed to
support women’s freedom to participate in the legal profession on the
condition that this did not commit them to granting women either the
right to vote or the right to become judges. Consequently, Viviani’s
bill became the law of December 1, 1900, that created a two-tiered legal
profession by admitting women to the bar without making any provisions for their entrance into other related jobs normally open to law
school graduates, from notary to magistrate.
Over the next four decades, advocates for women’s rights endeavored to equalize opportunities in the legal and juridical profession,
yet their concerted effort did not bring success until 1946. This article
asks why women in France were prevented for so long from serving as
judges. To address this central question, this study considers several
key aspects of the history of women and the judiciary from the early
twentieth century, when women began making inroads as lawyers, to
the moment when the National Constituent Assembly finalized egalitarian legislation and briefly beyond to the consequential reaction to
this reform. During these phases, what strategies did reformers pursue to bring equality to the judiciary? How did reformers work with
the National Assembly and other governmental bodies to further their
cause? How did the conceptualization of gender roles on both sides
inform the debates? How did the campaign for professional opportunities intersect with the broader women’s rights movement? The historical record of this controversy is replete with lively debates, selective
and comprehensive legislative efforts, and public appeals produced by
political, academic, and professional circles.
	This study of gender discrimination in the judiciary reveals how
enduring stereotypes ultimately shaped the organization, functioning,
and perception of the courts. The law, in turn, also influenced the social
relations of the sexes, especially by legitimizing prejudicial cultural attitudes and justifying inequitable practices. The initial antidiscrimina Archives Nationales (hereafter AN), C 5659, dossier 1734.
 Journal officiel (hereafter JO), Débats parlementaires, Sénat, Nov. 14, 1900, 839–40.
 Sara L. Kimble, “Justice Redressed: Women, Citizenship, and the Social Uses of the Law

in Modern France, 1890–1939” (PhD diss., University of Iowa, 2002).
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tion movement centered on cracking open the juvenile court judiciary,
the most culturally appropriate site for the application of women’s civic
maternalism. The second phase of the campaign, which emerged after
World War I, aspired to achieve equal treatment for women in both
work and political rights. These stages indicate that the conflict concerning female judges evolved along with attitudes about women’s rights
in French society. To contemporaries, the act of granting women the
“right to judge” signified women’s civil and political equality, and the
intransigence exhibited by antiegalitarians was another way to forestall
social change. The question of feminism lies at the heart of the debate
over whether and when France would permit female judges. Writ large,
the opposing sides represented, on the one hand, a conservative ideology with the tendency toward maintaining women’s traditional role in
reproduction and domesticity and, on the other hand, a movement to
promote the republican ideals of meritocracy and equality.
Female lawyers, the most vigorous and persistent campaigners to
open the judiciary to women, saw their cause as connected to advancing
women’s rights, the welfare of defendants, and the needs of the nation.
They faced an opposition that insisted on women’s inferiority and
resorted to a convenient claim that political rights were a prerequisite for admission to the judiciary. Judicial reformers also struggled
against the fact that married women’s civil rights—including their right
to work, to appear in court, and to contract—were subject to spousal
approval under the Civil Code.10 While these constraints were viewed
increasingly as anachronistic, they constituted a bulwark against the
claims for women’s judicial eligibility. The reform movement was disadvantaged not only by law but also by culture. Cultural prejudices
painted women as lacking the essential characteristics that judges typified: intellect, sangfroid, objectivity, and impartiality. Consequently,
the battle to remove the gender requirement from the judiciary posed
a challenge to male hegemony in society. The two camps could only
 On feminism and maternalism, see Karen M. Offen, “Defining Feminism: A Comparative
Historical Approach,” Signs 14 (1988): 119–57; and Françoise Thébaud, ed., Toward a Cultural Identity in the Twentieth Century, vol. 5 of A History of Women in the West (Cambridge, 1994), 405–15.
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, women constituted 40 percent of the whitecollar sector and 32 percent of the workforce overall. See Joan W. Scott, “The Woman Worker,”
in A History of Women in the West, vol. 4, ed. Geneviève Fraisse and Michelle Perrot (Cambridge,
1993), 407; and Deborah Simonton, A History of European Women’s Work, 1700 to the Present (London,
1998), 186.
 On capacité politique in the 1930s, see Anne Boigeol, “Les femmes et les cours: La difficile
mise en oeuvre de l’égalité des sexes dans l’accès à la magistrature,” Genèses 22 (1996): 111.
10 The reforms enacted in 1938 did little to alter the legal powers of the husband. See
Paul Smith, “The Eternal Minor: Feminism and the Civil Code,” in Feminism and the Third Republic:
Women’s Political and Civil Rights in France (Oxford, 1996), 163–211.
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agree that what was at stake in this contest was nothing less than the
future of women’s rights and of gender relations.
Women and the Professions
Prior to the creation of the Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature in 1958,
the Ministry of Justice administered the judiciary, accepting nominations for judgeships from the ranks of practicing lawyers or from the
successful candidates who completed specialized exams.11 In theory, all
male members of the bar could be called on to substitute for an absent
judge. Although women were not explicitly banned from the judiciary,
positive legislation was anticipated to authorize their participation.
The first cadre of female lawyers in France, seeking to ease their transition and to bolster their public image, argued that their profession was
ideal for many married women and compatible with raising a family.
Maria Vérone, the fifth woman to join the Paris bar, commented that as
a lawyer “a woman can live in perfect harmony in a man’s milieu, do the
same work as they do, and remain a good spouse and good mother.”12
Vérone also believed that women could “render great service” in the
judiciary and would be rewarded with professional opportunities when
they had proved to the public that they possessed a “spirit of equity” and
“juridical sense.”13 The prevailing opinion, however, was better represented by the Catholic political economy professor Charles Turgeon,
who thought that women were overly hasty in their desire to move into
public occupations. While he accepted the logic of admitting women
to the bar, he disapproved of further emancipation: “To speak frankly,
women are wrong to claim all the virile offices at the same time. A little
patience, if you please!”14 Regardless of Turgeon’s protest, the movement of female employees into the public sector was well under way.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, women made important
advances in the liberal and public professions, especially as educators
and inspectors.15 In her work on inspectrices, Linda L. Clark argues that
11 The Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature was intended “to restore the confidence of the
French people in their legal system” (The French National School for the Judiciary [Bordeaux, (2005?)],
3). See also John Bell, Sophie Boyron, and Simon Whittaker, Principles of French Law (Oxford,
1998), 60–66; and Anne Boigeol, “La formation des magistrats: De l’apprentissage sur le tas de
l’école professionnelle,” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 76 (1989): 49–64.
12 Vérone is quoted in Jane Misme, “Votre profession vous plaît-elle? Offre-t-elle un avenir
aux femmes?” Le matin, Aug. 12, 1911.
13 Maria Vérone, letter to the editor, Journal des femmes, Nov. 1909, 3.
14 Charles Turgeon, Le féminisme français: L’émancipation individuelle et sociale de la femme, vol. 1
(Paris, 1907), 467.
15 Linda L. Clark, Schooling the Daughters of Marianne: Textbooks and the Socialization of Girls in
Modern French Primary Schools (Albany, NY, 1984); Rebecca Rogers, From the Salon to the Schoolroom:
Educating Bourgeois Girls in Nineteenth-Century France (University Park, PA, 2005).
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female employees in the Ministry of the Interior successfully defended
their positions in public administration and supported a larger role
for women in civil service by using maternalist rhetoric. In this case,
the maternalists contended that women’s mothering skills singularly
qualified them for roles in the public sphere, a position that ultimately
undermined their primarily domestic identity.16 Women’s participation in the socially acceptable fields of nursing and social work had
similar effects. In her analysis of the professionalization of nursing,
Katrin Schultheiss notes the devotional nature of nurses’ duties and
maintains that the service rendered by nurses to both patients and doctors greatly facilitated the acceptance of a female-dominated nursing
corps.17 Evelyne Diebolt’s research on social workers and philanthropists documents the fundamental role women played in the establishment of the medical-social apparatus at the heart of the twentiethcentury welfare state.18 Social workers, professionalized in 1908, were
likewise perceived as altruistic, self-sacrificing, and maternal. The history of women’s entrance into traditionally masculine professions suggests that successful integration often occurred when women’s career
choices did not appear to disrupt the primacy of their obligations to
the household or to threaten masculine identity.
By the early twentieth century many government ministries had
hired women as typists and clerks, though women experienced discrimination in terms of pay and promotion. Women were unevenly
employed in the public sector because the law of December 29, 1882,
authorized ministries to self-regulate.19 In 1910, for example, a typical ministry hired only a few hundred women, while public education
employed more than seventy thousand. The Ministry of the General
Post Office and the National Archives kept their salary costs low by
strategically employing thousands of women.20 By contrast, the Min16 Linda L. Clark, “Feminist Maternalists and the French State: Two Inspectresses General
in the Pre–World War Third Republic,” Journal of Women’s History 12 (2000): 32–59; Clark, The
Rise of Professional Women in France: Gender and Public Administration since 1830 (Cambridge, 2000).
On maternalism in a comparative context, see Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, “Womanly Duties,
Maternalist Politics, and the Origins of Welfare States in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the
United States, 1880–1920,” American Historical Review 95 (1990): 1076–1108.
17 Katrin Schultheiss, Bodies and Souls: Politics and the Professionalization of Nursing in France,
1880–1922 (Cambridge, 2001).
18 Evelyne Diebolt, Les femmes dans l’action sanitaire, sociale et culturelle, 1901–2001: Les associations face aux institutions (Paris, 2001), 236–41; Diebolt, “Femmes protestantes faces aux politiques
de santé publique, 1900–1939,” Bulletin de la Société d’histoire du protestantisme français 146 (2000):
91–132; Brigitte Bouquet et al., eds., “Histoire des premières écoles de service social en France,
1908–1938,” special issue, Vie sociale, nos. 1–2 (1995).
19 Simone Verdeau, L’accession des femmes aux fonctions publiques (Toulouse, 1942), 93.
20 Dominique Bertinotti, “Carrières féminines et carrières masculines dans l’administration
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istry of Justice employed fewer than three hundred women as prison
guards, inspectors, instructors, and clerical staff.21 Internal politics and
attitudes about gender roles influenced such personnel decisions. The
Ministry of Justice remained opposed to hiring more women even as
the demand for staff expanded with the growth of the state in the twentieth century.
Women’s rights advocates called for an end to discrimination in
all fields and argued that women’s employment, especially in visible
and nontraditional jobs, could have a positive effect on the overall
position of women in society. Indeed, feminists monitored and documented women’s intellectual and professional successes worldwide as
signs of progress toward the equality of the sexes.22 Nancy F. Cott notes
that lawyers, like doctors and clergy, functioned as “arbiters of custom
and convention,” and women experienced exclusion from professional
opportunities as an affront and a reminder of the sexual hierarchy.23
From the belle epoque onward, the mainstream international women’s
rights movement called for the opening of the judiciary to women.24
The Feminist Movement and the Juvenile Courts
The campaign to allow women to serve as judges is linked to the history
of the juvenile courts in France because reformers propagated the idea
that women were best suited to preside over the juvenile courts first
before entering other jurisdictions. The influential jurist Emile Garçon
opined in 1911 that “no eloquent, persuasive speeches” were required
to justify women’s “obvious and logical role” in the juvenile courts.25
Others, many of them aligned with the philosophy of solidarism, called
for women to be admitted as juvenile judges to help enact the doctrine
of parens patriae, which put youth protection and moral rehabilitation
at the center of the court’s purpose. Over time a consensus grew among
children’s rights advocates, political leaders, and feminists that the
des postes et télégraphes à la fin du XIXe siècle,” Annales: Economies, sociétés, civilisations 3 (1985):
625–40.
21 Antoine Bonnefoy, Place aux femmes! Les carrières féminines administratives et libérales (Paris,
1913), 59, 303–5.
22 Laurence Klejman and Florence Rochefort, L’égalité en marche: Le féminisme sous la Troisième
République (Paris, 1989).
23 Nancy F. Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism (New Haven, CT, 1987), 215.
24 See, e.g., Ada Bittenbender, “Women in Law,” Report of the International Council of Women,
Assembled by the National Woman Suffrage Association, Washington, D.C., U.S. of America, March 25 to April
1, 1888 (Washington, DC, 1888), 173–79.
25 Emile Garçon, “Quelques observations sur le projet de loi relatif aux tribunaux pour
enfants,” Revue politique et parlementaire 70 (1911): 72.
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courts were deficient without the application of women’s civic-minded
motherliness.
	The new cohort of female lawyers was disproportionately assigned
to represent juvenile defendants when the Department of the Seine created a precursor of the juvenile court system in 1907. This early judicial
system was vulnerable to criticism on many fronts including the limited availability of police inspectors, the sensational and public nature
of the trials, and the judges’ perfunctory attention to the individual.26
Thousands of juvenile cases were heard annually, and during 1910 this
court institutionalized 3,424 boys and 899 girls for indefinite periods.27
Few observers believed that the courts were fulfilling their protective
goals, and feminist groups were among those who demanded immediate and comprehensive reforms.28
	In 1911 Vérone, a regular defender of youth since she joined the
Paris bar four years earlier, published a condemnation of the ad hoc
approach to juvenile justice and called for the greater participation
of women in the judiciary. Vérone, a freethinker with a socialist background, would emerge as the preeminent female lawyer of her generation and as a leader of the women’s rights movement.29 From her
professional experience she concluded that the judicial system treated
children callously and ineffectively. Calling for action, she published
the following criticism in the newspaper Le matin:
To understand the importance of legislative reform, one must
attend a hearing of the eighth correctional court. On Mondays, at
least fifty cases involving minors are heard by the court, and even
if the crowd is limited to those who received summonses and subpoenas, the throng of defendants, witnesses, and parents overflows
into the corridor, making it difficult for the defense counselors to
reach their clients. Inside the chamber, there is an indescribable
tumult: children are crying, mothers are weeping, fathers are protesting violently against judicial decisions that they do not understand; the children do not want to testify and must be carried bodily
by the guards to take the stand as they cry out for their parents; the
26 Henri Rollet, “The Probation System in France,” in Probation and Criminal Justice, ed.
Sheldon Glueck (New York, 1933), 298.
27 Statistique générale de la France, Annuaire statistique de la France (Paris, 1912), 125, table 1;
Patricia O’Brien, The Promise of Punishment: Prisons in Nineteenth-Century France (Princeton, NJ, 1982),
116.
28 Eugène Prévost and Paul Kahn, La loi sur les tribunaux pour enfants: Conditions d’application
(Paris, 1914), 63; Maria Vérone, discussion on June 29, 1911, in Premier congrès international des tribunaux pour enfants, ed. Marcel Kleine (Paris, 1912), 346.
29 See Maurice Hamburger, Nos plus grands avocats (Paris, 1930), 170–76; Jean Maitron et al.,
eds., Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français, 44 vols. (Paris, 1964–97), s.v. “Vérone,
Maria.”
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girls collapse under the weight of their anxieties, and the women
become ill; the presiding Judge Flory tries to reestablish order for
a few minutes, but these lamentable scenes redevelop . . . as justice
must carry on!30

Vérone observed that the juvenile trials were chaotic and fruitless for
several reasons. First, the judges lacked a depth of experience in part
because they worked no longer than a three-year tenure. The judges
might also be poorly informed on case details because they relied on
scanty evidence hastily compiled by the police. The panel of three
judges also juggled heavy caseloads, could give only cursory attention
to individuals, and often disagreed among themselves on sentencing.
Vérone expressed little confidence in sitting magistrates and hoped for
future ones who would consider such work an “honorable” assignment.
Second, the judges received no training in relevant topics such as child
psychology that might have aided the evaluation and sentencing processes.31 Third, the tools to prevent recidivism were few. Dispositions
might include an indefinite sentence in correctional facilities such as
La Petite Roquette, a boys’ prison notorious in the nineteenth century
for its cruel and tragically fatal use of solitary confinement. Alternatively, the delinquent might be committed to a colonie agricole (work
farm), such as Mettray, or any number of private charitable institutions
until reaching the age of majority.32 Neither state nor private reformatories were lauded for effectively rehabilitating youth.
	The French League for Women’s Rights (Ligue Française du Droit
des Femmes, or LFDF) mobilized to campaign for legislation to establish juvenile courts that were autonomous and proficient. In June 1911
the LFDF’s public meeting at the Musée Social promoted the anticipated benefits of female judges in the youth courts on the basis that
women were more devoted than men to the rehabilitation of delinquents. They proffered an appeal to women’s altruism: “Wives and
mothers, it is your social duty to point the way to the most sensible and
efficacious reforms. . . . In all countries where women have the right
to vote this reform . . . has already been realized . . . and criminality
has diminished.” The LFDF typically deployed a combination of maternalist and political rhetoric to argue that women’s experiences in the
domestic arena qualified them as experts for these new courts.33 By
30 Maria Vérone, “Les tribunaux spéciaux pour enfants,” Le matin, May 27, 1911.
31 André Moufflet, “Le meeting du 27 juin 1911,” Le droit des femmes, Jan. 1912, 12–15.
32 On institutional conditions, see Henri Gaillac, Les maisons de correction, 1830–1945 (Vau-

cresson, 1971). Clément Griffe’s influential history of the TEA made a special note of Vérone’s
criticism of the courts (Les tribunaux pour enfants: Etude d’organisation judiciaire et sociale [Paris, 1914],
181).
33 Moufflet, “Meeting,” 12–15. LFDF membership was one thousand by 1918. See Steven C.
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claiming that children deserved the more effective care that women
could provide, feminists challenged male authority within the family,
the judiciary, and the state. They believed that those most dedicated to
children’s welfare should preside over the future juvenile courts, and
Vérone headed their list.34 The possibility of female judges also represented the opportunity to change the balance of power in favor of children’s and women’s interests. Vérone, the general secretary of the LFDF,
had further ideas on how to apply other European approaches to rehabilitation based on an ethics-of-care model that nurtured children in
familial environments and provided them with vocational training.35
	The principal juvenile justice reformers readily acknowledged
that women satisfied their essential criteria for juvenile magistrates.
Women’s suitability resulted from their experience with children and
their appreciation of the moral and social stakes involved in treating
at-risk youth. Moreover, reformers trusted women to adopt the new
criminology that favored rehabilitation over punition. The vision of
the future juvenile courts then under discussion included new staff
such as specialized judges, court researchers (rapporteurs) to investigate
juveniles’ backgrounds and make sentencing recommendations to the
judges, and probation officers (délégués) to monitor rehabilitation measures. At the 1911 First International Congress on the Juvenile Courts,
the republican senator Ferdinand Dreyfus asserted that “women” and
“feminism” could resolve children’s social and psychological problems
where men had previously failed. He called on women to “participate
in this new jurisdiction, help us understand childhood, penetrate the
obscurity of the infantile psyche; you, our wives and our daughters,
look into the problems of these poor, little fleurs du mal, bruised and
languishing, sometimes malevolent; with you and by your action, we
will succeed in rebuilding their consciences and then return them to
regular society.”36 The substitut du procureur général Pierre de Casabianca,
a former senator, enumerated a judge’s essential qualities: “a real intuition into the child’s soul,” a “heart,” and sensitivity to children’s points
of view. Périclès Grimanelli, a former interior minister, advocated that
the future probation system also employ women.37
Hause and Anne R. Kenney, Women’s Suffrage and Social Politics in the French Third Republic (Princeton, NJ, 1984), 213.
34 Mary M. Lilly, “The French Women Lawyers,” Case and Comment 21 (1914): 433.
35 Comité de défense des enfants traduits en justice de Paris, Procès-verbal de la séance solennelle de rentrée du 14 janvier 1914 (Paris, 1914).
36 Quoted in Maria Vérone, “Premier congrès international,” Le droit des femmes, Jan. 1912,
18.
37 Périclès Grimanelli, report on June 29, 1911, in Kleine, Premier congrès international, 382.
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Women were potentially ideal candidates for the juvenile courts,
some reasoned, because working on such cases lacked prestige and
would have been undesirable for those who were not motivated, at
least in part, by altruism. Dreyfus and Casabianca knew of few male
judges who were interested in children’s affairs and of still fewer who
had expressed a willingness to leave their current positions to work
with youth. Senator Philippe Berger argued resolutely for employing
women as court auxiliaries because, he declared, “France is full of
good mothers” who would take on duties that might be “disagreeable,
exhausting, and difficult.”38 Liberal legal professionals claimed that
female lawyers already constituted a corps of experienced and dedicated children’s advocates from which juvenile magistrates might be
recruited. Nevertheless, legal reform was required to create new opportunities for women. In 1911–12 the parliamentary debates on the question of establishing the tribunaux pour enfants et adolescents (TEA) held
such promise.
The Law of July 22, 1912
The establishment of a judicial and social service system designed for
the moral recovery of delinquent children ultimately required the
modification of twenty-eight articles of the Penal Code, the redefinition of the minor’s legal status, the allocation of court chambers, and
the appointment of judges, délégués, and other staff to work on scores
of cases.39 After several false starts and eighteen months of negotiation, Senator Dreyfus’s bill won approval. The central innovation of
the resulting law of July 22, 1912, was that disobedient or unlawful
behavior by thirteen- to eighteen-year-olds was not criminal. Children
under thirteen would not stand trial at all; instead, they would undergo
mandatory “educative measures” as directed by a civil advisory council
(chambre de conseil ).40
During the legislative discussions, officials obliquely debated the
question of women entering the judiciary through a related issue on
the qualifications of the rapporteur. In theory, the rapporteur, a kind of
magistrate with limited powers, compiled pretrial evidence to establish the guilt of the adolescent defendant, a responsibility wielded by
38 Kleine, Premier congrès international, 13–14, 349–51. Berger was a former Hebrew professor
mentored by Ernest Rénan. See Jean Jolly, ed., Dictionnaire des parlementaires français (1889–1940)
(Paris, 1962), s.v. “Berger, Philippe.”
39 Monique Charvin et al., Recherche sur les juges des enfants: Approches historique, démographique,
sociologique (Paris, 1996), 12.
40 See Pascale Quincy-Lefebvre, Une histoire de l’enfance difficile: Familles, institutions et déviances,
1880–fin des années trente (Paris, 1997).
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the juge d’instruction in adult cases. René Bérenger, the chair of the parliamentary commission, regarded the rapporteurs as a group of courtappointed rogatory agents who would conduct thorough inquiries into
children’s backgrounds to plumb the depths of the salient factors influencing their behavior. These pretrial investigations might also include
searching households for criminal evidence, interrogating relevant
parties, and ordering an autopsy in the event of a murder. Bérenger’s
extraparliamentary critics were displeased with many aspects of this
plan including the possibility of authorizing women to do the work of
an examining magistrate.41
	The strongest supporter of potential female rapporteurs was the leftwing social-democrat senator Berger. He proposed to the Senate that
women should serve in this capacity so they might apply their unique
qualities of “heart” and “devotion” to conduct extensive interviews with
children and their families. He described women’s suitability for these
inquiries by drawing a contrast between the sexes:
Woman will bring maternal sentiments [to the task] that will permit
us to enter into the life and soul of the child, to understand him,
and also to learn what regime to apply to enlighten him. It is in the
nature of woman to be most devoted to these questions. Moreover,
messieurs, and forgive me for saying so, it is easier to find women of
heart and head who, by an absolute concordance of their lives with
their principles, provide a high moral example to uplift those who
have fallen.42

Berger justified his position on the basis of conventional conceptions
of gender difference. He also lauded female lawyers as admirable, indefatigable, and positive influences on the current ad hoc juvenile court
hearings. He opined that when future juvenile courts opened in smaller
towns, they would need the right to draw on women in the absence
of appropriate men. Finally, he encouraged an affirmative vote on his
amendment as a service to the nation’s children and the public good
and to respect “women’s altruism.”43
	The justice minister, Antoine Perrier, countered Berger’s seemingly innocuous plan with a fierce and unequivocal answer: “It will not
do to grant to women, under this disguised form, the authorization
41 Bell, Boyron, and Whittaker, Principles of French Law, 123. The deputy Paul Beauregard
attacked the rapporteurs as “fake judges,” while law professor Garçon argued that their power to
search parents’ homes violated adults’ right to privacy. See JO, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des
députés, July 12, 1911, 2824; Garçon, “Quelques observations,” 72.
42 Berger also promoted legislation on weekly rest for workers (1906) and the suppression
of the prostitution of minors (1907). See JO, Débats parlementaires, Sénat, May 19, 1911, 506.
43 Ibid.
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to become judges.” Perrier insisted that women were prohibited from
the judiciary by the law of 1900 and that their undisputed devotion to
children could find other venues for expression. He warned senators
that if Berger’s proposal was ratified, “feminists” would capitalize on
this opportunity to infiltrate all other courts. Evoking women’s duty
to the mission sociale, he declared: “The role that we leave to woman
outside the halls of justice is still sufficiently great and attractive to her.
In rejecting the amendment, you can be certain that she will not be
deprived of filling it.” Moreover, Perrier refused to tolerate any suggestion of a dispensation for female lawyers to enter the judiciary. Senator
Dominique Delahaye, who thought Perrier was eliding significant differences between the rapporteur and the juge, interrupted with typical
verve to call for an immediate discussion of women’s admission to the
judiciary. His request was ignored. Berger defended his amendment by
insisting that he was not promoting a feminist agenda but only wanted
what he thought was best for children. After all, his intention was to
permit women to serve as court auxiliaries, not as associate or presiding judges. In a hurried vote, the senators approved Berger’s amendment, and thus women were authorized to become rapporteurs in the
new courts.44
How did the senators conceptualize gender roles in such a way that
they ultimately carved a place for women in the face of the minister’s
claim that this breached the order of the judiciary? During the debate
senators had revealed their sympathetic views of the public roles women
played, especially in their capacities as philanthropists or attentive lawyers. The self-described antifeminist senator Emmanuel de Las Cases
praised avocates for crafting a trusting rapport with delinquents. Las
Cases, who believed that “woman’s place is in the home,” was nevertheless “almost converted” when he saw female lawyers assisting children with the devotion of “spiritual mothers.”45 For his part, Senator
Dreyfus commended Vérone as “a woman of great dedication” and as
“our colleague” who could instruct everyone on the complexities of
delinquency.46
Berger’s amendment mandating inclusiveness for the new job of
rapporteur generally gained public approbation, while Perrier’s opposition did not. The jurist Clément Griffe explained that it is not “feminist” to “place women where they belong, looking after the children,
44 Ibid., 507–8. The admission of women was later completed by a circular in Jan. 1914. See
Magdeleine Lévy, Les auxiliaires du tribunal pour enfants délégués et rapporteurs (Saint-Amand, 1933),
224n1.
45 JO, Débats parlementaires, Sénat, Mar. 9, 1911, 238.
46 JO, Débats parlementaires, Sénat, May 18, 1911, 503.
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especially the youngest ones, who might otherwise be bruised in our
big, maladroit hands.”47 Le temps disapproved of Perrier’s alignment
with the “strict traditionalists” and concluded that since women had
the right to defend clients, they were also competent to judge them.48
The novelist Lucien Descaves suggested that if the judicial edifice
“trembled” with the arrival of women, then “repairs to its foundation”
must be long overdue.49 For Marguerite Durand, the founder of the
feminist daily newspaper La Fronde, this amendment was a tremendous
victory: “It is the entrance of women into the judiciary,” and “it is a real
revolution from the point of view of law, legislation, custom, and prejudice. Feminists must mark this important occasion by publicizing their
usefulness, not only for the feminist cause but to prove that this cause
is tied to all social progress.”50 Vérone initially called this vote only a
“triumph of common sense,” rather than the “triumph of feminism,”
but later she optimistically celebrated the amendment as a guarantor of
“the principle of the equality of the sexes.”51 The critic Denise Moniez
would write that the law assured a place for women whose presence
in the courts hardly needed justification as they already “put all their
force and grace into knowing how to be mothers.”52 In truth, female
rapporteurs posed little threat to gender hierarchies, as the central task
of tactfully interviewing children on behalf of the justice system fell
readily within commonplace ideas of women’s presumably natural abilities. Moreover, eligibility was not a mandate for employment. Yet the
response by the senators, jurists, and prominent feminists to this debate
suggests that Perrier’s traditionalist argument was beginning to lose its
persuasive force. For the reform-minded, it was evident that women
should have a role in the juvenile courts. Toward that end, Vérone was
shortly thereafter appointed to the extraparliamentary commission on
child protection.53
	Everyone rightfully wondered whether full judicial access for
women would soon be granted as Perrier had forecast, and feminists
were eager to facilitate such a reform. In 1913, at the Tenth International Council of Women (Congrès International des Femmes), dele47 Griffe, Tribunaux, 267.
48 “Le féminisme au Sénat et au Palais,” Le temps, May 20, 1911.
49 Lucien Descaves, “Les congrès des tribunaux pour enfants réclame la femme comme

juge d’instruction,” June 25, 1911, in Bibliothèque Marguerite Durand (hereafter BMD), 347.
50 Marguerite Durand, “A propos des tribunaux pour enfants: Le rôle des femmes,” Les
nouvelles, June 29, 1911.
51 Vérone, “Les tribunaux spéciaux pour enfants”; Vérone, “Les femmes rapporteurs aux
tribunaux pour enfants,” Le droit des femmes, Jan. 1912, 11.
52 Denise Moniez, Tribunaux d’enfants (Cahors, 1914), 14.
53 Cécile Brunschvicg, “France,” Jus suffragii, Aug. 1, 1913, 6.
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gates voted unanimously for women’s equal access to legal and juridical
careers on the same conditions as men. The attorney Agathe Dyvrande
faulted the narrowness of the 1900 law for “establishing an inequality,
prejudicial to women, between lawyers of the two sexes; it closes the
door by which women have already entered into the sanctuary of justice
itself.”54 The low numbers of European women pursuing legal studies,
relative to other fields, was attributed to their exclusion from the judiciary, hostility from male colleagues, and poor salaries.55
When the new TEA opened to serve the Department of the Seine
in March 1914, women were most often found in the same position as
before the law of 1912: working as pro bono lawyers for minor defendants. Observers considered the new courts undervalued, evidenced by
the fact that the first Parisian hearings were held in a “Spartan,” even
“undignified” room, without a separate waiting area for children.56 In
the provinces many judges continued to work part time in ad hoc juvenile courts, and the new system was not mandated by law in the colonies
until 1928 and 1933.57 The attorney Suzanne Grinberg believed that
effective courts must adopt the American-style reeducation approach
that offered social, moral, and educational assistance to children to
prevent recidivism, rather than punishment.58 This approach was more
popular among women than men in France. Henri Rollet, the first
president of the children’s courts for the Seine, who had affinities to
women’s rights groups, applied this more sensitive approach to his adjudications, favoring probation over confinement, only to be demoted in
1917 by traditionalist supervisors who judged him “excessively indulgent,” a fault that they insisted threatened to “compromise the repressive efforts” of the courts.59 Rollet also advocated the employment of
female judges, while his superiors did not.60
54 Mme. [Ghénia] Avril de Sainte-Croix, ed., Dixième congrès international des femmes: Oeuvres
et institutions féminines, droits des femmes; 2 juin 1913, Paris (Paris, 1914), 577, 407, 397.
55 Ibid., 386–87, 396–97.
56 Georges Bourdon, “Les tribunaux pour enfants,” Le Figaro, Mar. 7, 1914.
57 Martine Kaluszynksi, “Enfance coupable et criminologie,” in Protéger l’enfant: Raison juridique et pratiques socio-juridicaires, XIXe–XXe siècle, ed. Michel Chauvière, Pierre Lenoël, and Eric
Pierre (Rennes, 1996), 116. The 1912 law was not initially implemented in the colonies because
the bill omitted the standard language, a lacuna that went uncorrected until 1928, with the island
colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Réunion later added in 1933. Report by M. Monnerville,
bill adopted without discussion by the Chamber on Nov. 16, 1933.
58 “Les tribunaux pour enfants,” L’union morale, Jan. 1914, 401–4.
59 AN, BB6 (II) 1190, dossier Rollet.
60 The TEA did not produce a decline in criminality, but the number of children languishing in prisons did gradually fall as alternative treatments gained popularity. For example, the
number of boys and girls sent to correctional penitentiaries fell to 3,205 in 1919, down by 26 percent from 1910, with boys the majority of those in custody. See Statistique Générale de la France,
Annuaire statistique de la France (Paris, 1912–24), tables établissements d’éducation correctionnelle.
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The Legacy of War and the Masculine Judiciary
At the outbreak of war in August 1914, most feminists prioritized their
national patriotism over their political goals, and the momentum of
many of their campaigns stalled. Although the war opened a myriad
of job and leadership opportunities in places ranging from munitions
factories to mayoral offices, little changed substantively in the judiciary.
During the war the justice system continued to run in the absence of
the deployed men, as older judges (aged thirty-five to forty-seven) were
put on reserve status and female lawyers and retirees did the remainder
of the work.61 Women’s wartime service tended to fuel a positive view
of women’s intellectual capability among the social elite.62 Evolving attitudes were not enough, however, to change the Senate’s position on
expanding women’s political rights. At the end of the war suffragists
looked enviously to those countries where women’s exclusion from the
electorate had recently come to an end, including Russia, Britain, Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the United States. During
the interwar period the French Senate would refuse, on four occasions,
to ratify the voting rights bills that had met with deputies’ approval.
Outside France women also benefited from the falling of gender
barriers in many professions, including the law and judiciary. Marguerite Pichon-Landry, the leader of the National Council of Frenchwomen (Conseil National des Femmes Françaises, or CNFF), praised
the opening of administrative and professional opportunities to women
in other countries and argued that the French legislature must recognize the economic necessity of women’s paid work for the survival of
some families and the dignity of women. Like many others, she argued
that the dual interests of the workforce and the family could be served
simultaneously by admitting women into regular professions typified
by, but not limited to, public service.63 In the politically unstable postwar decades feminists continued to target the judiciary as sorely in need
of women’s energetic and competent work, and their protests formed
an intrinsic claim to equal citizenship.
	In 1922 the Marseille LFDF attempted to undermine the authority
of the masculine judiciary by casting doubt on men’s fitness as juvenile magistrates. The attorney Marie-Thérèse Isnard questioned the
credibility of an exclusively male TEA and rejected the supposition
61 Jean-Pierre Royer, Histoire de la justice en France: De la monarchie absolue à la République (Paris,
1995), 674–83.
62 Smith, Feminism and the Third Republic, 104.
63 Marguerite Pichon-Landry, “Résume du rapport présenté à la section d’études féminines
du Musée social sur l’admission des femmes aux fonctions publiques,” report, Musée Social, Mar.
16, 1920.
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that women could not be judges without first establishing their eligibility to become legislators and voters. A member of the Marseille
bar since 1914, she believed that women’s exclusion from the judiciary
was illogical and asserted that the public would prefer female judges
because their decisions would “always be inspired by the purest spirit
of equity.”64 This attack on masculine partiality was a trope in feminist
rhetoric designed to change cultural attitudes on gendered attributes.
Another seemingly promising moment for judicial reform came
in the wake of the publication of Le tribunal pour enfants (1923), the first
comprehensive study of the TEA’s effectiveness. The unlikely author,
Chloe Owings, an American Protestant social worker and wartime Red
Cross volunteer, then a student at the Sorbonne, evaluated every stage
of a juvenile defendant’s experience from the pretrial detention to
the court hearings to reclusion in a penitentiary colony or a convent.
While researching her thesis Owings gained extraordinary access to the
courts, to private religious and state confinement facilities, and to the
records of the police and the service des moeurs (vice squad). She discovered widespread indifference to the TEA among judges and lawyers,
who revealed that they would rather work on civil trials than juvenile
ones because the former led to promotions, garnered esteem from colleagues, and could be profitable. She concluded that the court procedures failed to provide children with either rehabilitation or guidance
and that the exclusion of women from the courts was a contributing
factor. Owings strongly recommended that women should not be prevented from applying their “social housekeeping” skills to improve the
status of delinquent youth.65 Moreover, she was alarmed that women
remained almost entirely absent from the organizations that advised
the courts. The influential Committee to Defend Children in the Justice
System met regularly at the Parisian Palais de Justice and included only
1 woman, Vérone, among its 131 members. Such imbalance prompted
Owings to ask: “Do women not wish to take part in these meetings,
or do the men not admit them?”66 Reformers applauded Owings’s cri64 Marie-Thérèse Isnard, “De la nécessité de la femme magistrat,” Le droit des femmes, May
1922, 120–22.
65 Chloe Owings, Le tribunal pour enfants: Etude sur le traitement de l’enfance délinquante en France
(Paris, 1923), 317. Owings had arrived in France in 1916 with limited funds and little familiarity
with the language, yet she contributed assiduously to the war relief efforts. She received a Certificate and Medal of la Reconnaissance Française aux Etrangers for her dedication. She stayed
on after the armistice to teach social work at the pioneering professional training center of the
Ecole Pratique de Service Sociale, founded in 1913 by the Protestant pastor Paul Doumergue, then
studied sociology and political science with Sorbonne professors Paul Fauconnet and Célestin
Bouglé. See SL, A-164, Chloe Owings Papers, unpublished MSS, 159–60.
66 Owings, Tribunal pour enfants, 322, 52–56. Vérone was well aware of her uniqueness on
the council, and she commended the Paris bâtionnier Fernand Labori’s willingness to break with
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tique, and the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques honored
her thesis with a Prix Carlier.67
	The effect of Owings’s work, however, was to redirect the thrust
of juvenile court reform away from the question of female judges and
toward the creation of a corps of female social workers dedicated to
assisting juvenile offenders. At the invitation of Judge Rollet, Owings,
together with French philanthropists and social workers, organized a
social casework apparatus to investigate the socioeconomic and medical conditions of each delinquent child, provide a substantive dossier
to the judges, and help place troubled or needy children in appropriate
facilities.68 The staff of the Social Service to Children in Moral Danger (Service Social de l’Enfance en Danger Moral, or SSE) completed
the investigative work that had been designated for the rapporteurs but
had become “a dead letter.”69 Germaine Poinso-Chapuis, the minister
of health and population from 1947 to 1948, later concluded that the
SSE’s work was invaluable; otherwise France would have been “at zero”
in 1945 in terms of the rehabilitation of delinquent minors.70
Interwar Campaigns for Judicial Reform
As the SSE filled in service gaps for juvenile delinquents and suffrage
activists reenergized their efforts, the National Assembly reconsidered
advancing women’s employment opportunities in the various branches
of the legal profession. In the aftermath of the war, France faced a
paucity of traditional candidates for the bench that renewed the discus“tradition” and “prejudices” to include her (“Les conquêtes du féminisme,” Le droit des femmes,
Mar. 1912, 6).
67 The prize is given to recognize the “most significant contribution to the field” in three
years. See Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, “Rapport sur le concours pour le prix Carlier à décerner en 1923,”
Séances et travaux de l’académie des sciences morales et politiques 84 (1924): 115–16. Thanks to Pierre Kerbrat for providing this article. She also received the Médaille Pénitentiaire and became a chevalier
in the Légion d’Honneur. See SL, A-164, Chloe Owings Papers, unpublished MSS, 250; and Knox
College Archives, Galesburg, IL, Owings to Knox College president Albert Britt, Dec. 14, 1927.
68 Denise Lenain and Georges-Michel Salomon, “Une pionnière du service social, MarieThérèse Vieillot,” Vie sociale 10–11 (1988): 418.
69 Dominique Dessertine, “Aux origines de l’assistance éducative les tribunaux pour enfants
et la liberté surveillée, 1912–1941,” in Chauvière, Lenoël, and Pierre, Protéger l’enfant, 140.
70 Henriette Chandet, “Mme. Germaine Poinso-Chapuis: Députée des Bouches-duRhône,” L’union nationale des femmes 15 (1946): 3. Aid existed in cities only; elsewhere inquiries into
children’s backgrounds were limited or even “nonexistent.” See Marie-Sylvie Dupont-Bouchat
and Eric Pierre, eds., Enfance et justice au XIXe siècle (Paris, 2001), 337. In 1952 the SSE changed
its name to the Olga Spitzer Association, and a related organization exists today as La Fondation
d’Enfance. See Pierre de Casabianca and Raoul Gabriel de Pascalis, Nouveau guide pour la protection
de l’enfance traduite en justice, à l’usage des magistrats, des avocats et des auxiliaires des tribunaux pour enfants
et adolescents (Paris, 1934), 358–60; Sarah Fishman, The Battle for Children: World War II, Youth Crime,
and Juvenile Justice in Twentieth-Century France (Cambridge, 2002), 24; Diebolt, Femmes dans l’action
sanitaire, 236–41; and Diebolt, “Femmes protestantes faces aux politiques,” 91–132, 122–27.
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sions on possible roles for women. The postwar parliamentary debates
no longer focused on the juvenile judiciary but ranged widely, from
granting women narrow access to specific offices to legislating their
complete professional equality.
	In 1929 the prosuffrage Radical senator Louis Martin campaigned
for an ultimately unsuccessful bill to admit women to the ubiquitous
positions of notaire (civil law official) and avoué (court procedural officer). Martin reasoned that “in a nation where the number of women
exceeds that of men by nearly two million, all fair-minded people accept
the necessity of helping women to earn an honest living, whether in
the liberal professions or the manual trades.” Martin believed that “the
most implacable adversaries” of potential female judges still approved
of women entering these more humble but respectable legal positions.
A 1928 survey had indeed documented this mixture of opinions.71 The
glacial rate of cultural and legal change frustrated the feminist lawyer
Odette Simon-Bidaux: “In France, a woman cannot vote in any election,
obtain a passport without [spousal] authorization, enter the Bourse,
assume hautes functions, leave the marital domicile, dress like a man, or
render justice, but she could be guillotined.”72 When the Senate finally
debated a bill on admitting women into the notariat in 1932, the egalitarian proposal was entirely overshadowed by the Radical senator Raymond Duplantier’s tirade on the inferiority of women to men and their
suitability only for the oldest profession. Although the bill was lost, suffragists organized to unseat Duplantier in the next election.73
While France resisted reforms, most central and eastern European
nations opened their legal and juridical professions to women. Consequently, in 1928 female lawyers and judges formed the International
Federation of Women in the Legal Careers (Fédération International
des Femmes des Carrières Juridiques, or FIFCJ) to build solidarity. At
the outset Estonian, Spanish, Polish, German, and Austrian women
traveled to France to develop strategies to improve women’s conditions, especially in family law, political rights, and job opportunities.
This association brought internationally recognized activists to France,
including the Madrid lawyer Clara Campoamor, who gave prosuffrage
lectures, and the Polish judge Grabinska, who met with cabinet officials
to lobby for women’s access to the judiciary.74
	In 1929 Agathe Dyvrande-Thévenin, president of the FIFCJ, put
71 Martin is quoted in Louis Saint-Laurens, L’accession de la femme aux fonctions judiciaires (Toulouse, 1931), 11–12; Maria Vérone, “Le féminisme au Sénat,” L’oeuvre, Mar. 12, 1930.
72 Odette Simon-Bidaux, “En France la femme ne peut pas . . . ,” Vu, Feb. 13, 1929.
73 See Smith, Feminism and the Third Republic, 137–39, 143–50.
74 BMD, dossier Clara Campoamor; Moreau, “Conférence.”
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the question of why there were no female judges in France to the minister of justice, Lucien Hubert. In turn, Deputy Pierre Cathala, a Radical
lawyer, agreed to sponsor a bill to admit women to the juvenile court
judiciary. Before legislation could be introduced, however, the cabinet was shuffled, and neither Hubert nor Cathala could shepherd the
reform through.75 The following year Grinberg, as president of the
National Association of Female Jurists (Association des Femmes Juristes,
or AFJ), renewed the appeal with Cathala, who was now the minister of
labor. In this round she upped the ante and requested that all judicial posts be opened equally to female candidates. Grinberg, who first
publicly announced her desire to work as a judge in 1909, characterized the current political and judicial system as riddled with hypocrisy,
inconsistency, and injustice, all of which, she predicted, women’s presence could ameliorate. The restrictions on her professional rights were
a kind of prism through which she viewed social inequality: “[Women]
have the same privileges, the same prerogatives, as men, with the one
exception that they cannot complete a tribunal in the event that one of
its members is detained or absent. Women cannot, even temporarily,
render justice, except in the conseils de prud’hommes.”76 In this lament
she called attention to the anomaly that since the early 1900s women
could vote and be elected as judges in the labor arbitration courts of
the conseils du travail (decree, September 17, 1900) and the conseil supérieur du travail (decree, March 14, 1903).77 In the case of the conseils de
prud’hommes, women had been eligible to run for the elected positions
since the laws of 1907 and 1908, and by 1930 women were serving as
judges on an equal basis with men.78
	The following year a more conciliatory Cathala appointed the
Radical deputy André Bardon to introduce legislation to admit women
to the judiciary on an equal basis. The deputies Bardon, Anatole de
Monzie, and Camille Planche then proposed an amendment to this
effect during a long debate devoted to the reorganization of the tribunaux de première instance (civil courts) in April 1930. The language of
75 “Les femmes juges,” La Française, Nov. 23, 1929. See BMD, dossier Enfance délinquante,
France (1899–1940). On the FIFCJ, see Sara L. Kimble, “Women, Law, and Friendship: Activities
of the International Federation of Women in Legal Careers between the Two World Wars” (paper
presented to the Social Science Historical Association, Minneapolis, Nov. 5, 2006).
76 Camille Bélilon, “Madame Grumberg,” Journal des femmes, Aug.–Sept. 1909, 1; Suzanne
Grinberg, “Le pouvoir judiciaire: Les auxiliaires de la justice,” in La vie publique dans la France contemporaine (Paris, 1925), 43.
77 Georges Scelle, “La représentation politique,” Revue du droit public 28 (1911): 547.
78 Articles 5–6 of the law of Mar. 27, 1907, extended voting and electability to women. See
René Bloch and Henry Chaumel, Traité théorique et pratique des conseils de prud’hommes (Paris, 1925),
10; and Maria Vérone, Appel à la justice adressé par le Conseil national des femmes françaises à la Chambre
des députés et au Sénat (Paris, 1909), 9.
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their proposal was simple: “Women can be nominated as judges on the
same condition as men.” They argued that new recruits were desperately
needed to fill present and projected staff vacancies, and they called for
the equal treatment of women in the workforce. Bardon, whose wife
was a lawyer, also declared: “Woman has a place in the courts. In the
tribunaux pour enfants, she will undoubtedly do better than the sexe fort
as a judge, and her instincts for justice and motherliness will catalyze
the justice system to become more just.”79 The socialist Paul Ramadier
(later the first prime minister of the Fourth Republic) defended the
proposal, arguing that the courts would provide the best career for
“feminism” to be “progressively and methodically” disseminated.
	In the ensuing discussion deputies questioned women’s legal eligibility to serve in public office and reiterated the old anxiety that
women’s entrance into the judiciary might result in women’s abandonment of the foyer. As if to soften the sting of his disapproval, the
deputy Pierre Colomb praised the beauty of women by quoting Cyrano
de Bergerac before declaring that France was not ready for female judges
because “the right to judge is one of the most serious, and there are
many things to grant to women before deciding on her admission to
the magistrature.” Colomb’s opposition was rooted in the belief that
the judiciary was graced with a quality of souveraineté publique that made
it impossible to grant women “the right to judge” before “the right to
vote.” He proclaimed that prioritizing judicial rights before suffrage
was “illogical and premature” and that to do so failed to respect the
gradual “stages” of women’s “civic education.”80 The minister of justice,
Raoul Péret, also rejected the proposal, cautioning the deputies that
they had not looked at the consequences that approval would precipitate. He envisioned a slippery slope: “Will you admit them to the ministerial offices of avoués, notaires, greffiers? Will they be permitted in the
prefectorial administration to become engineers of roads and bridges,
to enter, in a word, all of public administration?”81 Heeding his warning, the deputies voted down the amendment 378 to 200.
	The jurist Louis Saint-Laurens claimed this vote as a victory for
traditionalists. He described the judiciary as “the last fortress, still
intact, of our masculinisme judiciaire erected against the assaults of feminism.”82 Grinberg responded to this news with disappointment tinged
79 JO, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des députés, Apr. 5, 1930, 1559–61. The chamber passed a
proposal for the municipal vote brought by Raymond Poincaré in July 1927, but requests by the
chamber in 1928 and 1929 did not move the Senate to take up the issue. See Siân Reynolds, France
between the Wars: Gender and Politics (New York, 1996), 210.
80 JO, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des députés, Apr. 5, 1930, 1561.
81 Ibid., 1562.
82 Saint-Laurens, Accession de la femme, 13.
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Abel Faivre, “Messieurs, la cour!” Le journal, April 6, 1930

with resentment, alleging that men lacked objectivity and fairness when
confronted with professionally successful or authoritative women.83
Le journal echoed the controversy by publishing a caricature of three
female judges, dressed in ermine-trimmed judicial robes, striding smilingly into a courtroom in high heels, waving demurely, and touching
up their makeup (fig. 1). The humor of the image emerged from the

1930.

83 Suzanne Grinberg, “A propos des femmes magistrats et greffiers,” La Française, Apr. 19,

630

FRENCH HISTORICAL STUDIES

juxtaposition of seemingly superficial women masquerading as judges.
Such cartoonish women could never embody the ideal characteristics of judges such as rigor, impartiality, rationality, and authority.84
These stereotypes of female coquetry and lack of solemnity reified the
National Assembly’s rejection of equity.
	The French judiciary was, in fact, facing a recruitment crisis. In
1926 Vérone noted that only 73 judges were promoted to fill 453 openings. By 1930 Bardon cited a need for 433 juges titulaires and another
79 supplementary ones. The National Association of Lawyers (Association Nationale des Avocats, or ANA) recognized the paucity of candidates for the magistrate’s concours and debated the options at their
1930 meeting in Algiers. The majority favored lowering the minimum
age for judicial candidates. Vérone argued passionately for the admission of women to the judiciary, remarking that more than two hundred
women at the time worked at the Paris bar alone and that, following
such a reform, the proportion of female law students would certainly
increase from its current 12 percent.85 Anticipating that veteran avocates would seek places on the bench, Vérone counseled that it would
be “much better to plead in front of a capable, competent, experienced
woman” than to have one’s case judged by a young, inexperienced, and
less competent man. Although Vérone’s cohort politely complimented
her as individually remarkable, they rejected her recommendation and
instead approved lowering the age qualification to twenty-three. The
National Assembly promptly promulgated this proposal in the law of
July 16, 1930.86
	The ANA’s refusal to approve women for the bench reflected
a broader and intensifying antagonism toward the employment of
women, notably married ones, during the interwar years. Susan Pedersen writes of the strong opposition of the Catholic Women’s Civil and
Social Union (Union Féminine Civique et Sociale, or UFCS), which “laid
responsibility for virtually every social ill,” from juvenile delinquency to
falling birthrates, “at the feet of married women’s work.”87 This loose
84 Abel Faivre, “Messieurs, la cour!” Le journal, Apr. 6, 1930.
85 Based on a total enrollment of 9,971 law students during the academic year 1929–30;

Annuaire statistique de la ville de Paris, 1929, 1930 et 1931 (Paris, 1933), 533.
86 Maria Vérone, “Le congrès de Marseille,” Le droit des femmes, Dec. 1930, 298–300; JO,
Débats parlementaires, Chambre des députés, Apr. 5, 1930, 1559; Le congrès d’Alger de l’Association nationale
des avocats (22–24 avril 1930), Bulletin de l’Association nationale des avocats inscrits aux barreaux de France,
des colonies et pays de protectorat (Paris, 1930), 111–12.
87 Susan Pedersen, “Catholicism, Feminism, and the Politics of the Family during the Late
Third Republic,” in Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States, ed.
Seth Koven and Sonya Michel (New York, 1993), 246–76; Karen M. Offen, “Body Politics: Women,
Work, and the Politics of Motherhood in France, 1920–1950,” in Maternity and Gender Policies:

FEMINISM AND THE JUDICIARY

631

coalition of Catholic groups, pronatalists, and doctors pressured married women to leave the workforce to make room for unemployed men.
Although the position of the UFCS was extreme, those who supported
women’s right to work on the basis of necessity or fairness found themselves on the defensive, especially as the progress made on behalf of
female white-collar workers met serious setbacks. Most significantly for
the public sector, the prefect of the Seine had instituted gender-based
quotas on the concours for rédacteurs (chief editorial clerks) in 1929;
these quotas were followed by restrictions on women’s employment in
other central administration ministries.88
	Cognizant of this antagonistic climate, women’s rights advocates
pursued another avenue to judicial access by approaching the supreme
court of administrative justice, the Conseil d’Etat. Marie-Madeleine
Dauvet-Thiénot, an experienced lawyer and the leader of the French
Union for Women’s Suffrage (Union Française pour le Suffrage des
Femmes, or UFSF) in Troyes, was nominated for the bench in 1932. The
justice minister responded to Dauvet-Thiénot’s application by restating
her ineligibility based on her sex.89 A year earlier her exclusion might
have been justified by her failure to fulfill military service (an impossibility for women), except that this requirement for civil servants was
abolished in 1931.90 Instead, the Conseil d’Etat’s decision sustained the
prohibition on women by harking back to the 1810 regulations of the
legal profession, which in fact had never engaged this question. The
Conseil d’Etat also reiterated the spirit of the 1900 law by claiming that
women “could never be called to complete the courts or tribunals in an
act of replacing absent judges.”91 Dauvet-Thiénot countered that this
decision was patently unjust. After all, she noted, avocates had the same
requirements of service and duties as male lawyers, including paying
professional taxes, yet they could not reap the same benefits, such as
eligibility for professional advancement into the judiciary.92 Her appeal
was to no immediate avail.
Women and the Rise of the European Welfare States, 1880s–1950s, ed. Gisela Bock and Pat Thane (London, 1991), 128–59.
88 Clark, Rise of Professional Women, 69–175.
89 Germaine Poinso-Chapuis, “Rapport de Mme. Poinso-Chapuis présenté au nom de
la Commission de la justice et de la législation générale sur la proposition de loi de M. Robert
Lecourt et plusieurs de ses collègues ayant pour objet de permettre aux femmes d’accéder à la
magistrature (Rapport n. 523 annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 6 février 1946),” Pouvoir
judiciaire 11 (1956): 2.
90 Marcel Waline, Manuel élémentaire de droit administratif (Paris, 1936), 347.
91 Conseil d’Etat, Feb. 28, 1934, quoted in Verdeau, Accession des femmes, 94, 119.
92 Marie-Madeleine Dauvet-Thiénot, “Un verdict du Conseil d’état,” La Française, Mar. 17,
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On another tack, defenders of women’s rights argued in favor of
the social benefits of women’s work. Turning around the traditional
opposition between work and domesticity, Jean Laroque, the procureur
général from Caen, opined: “Women deserved to assume the sièges of
justice; it is not in the name of a ‘foyer in peril’ that this opportunity
is denied; on the contrary, it is to protect the household that women
must be called to the judiciary. Are we alone in failing to understand
that to segregate women from certain functions is not only an injustice but also a vehicle of prejudice in society?”93 Using similar rhetoric, Juliette Veillier-Duray, the president of the French Association of
University Women (Association des Françaises Diplômées des Universités, or AFDU), argued that work for women was not only a necessity but the principal mode for “intellectual and spiritual progress” in
the world, a means for women to lead society toward greater perfection.94 Judge Rollet asked: “When will it be permissible for a young
female lawyer to substitute for an absent magistrate in the juvenile
courts?”95 These commentators defended the embattled belief that
the justice system would benefit from women’s greater participation
in its workforce.
	In the 1930s feminists formed a united front to combat the rising
unemployment of intellectual workers and associated antipathy. The
combined energies of the associations of female jurists (AFJ), university women (AFDU), and the labor section of the CNFF focused on
opening careers to women, especially in the judiciary, the civil service,
and the foreign service.96 The jurists’ lobby, which claimed a membership of one thousand by 1937, took the initiative by organizing debates
and publishing articles to stress the value of women’s employment.97
They also directed support to Suzanne Borel, who in 1930 had been the
first woman to pass the civil service exam to join the diplomatic corps;
however, she had not been given a post befitting her qualifications
on the grounds of her inferior civil status as a woman. Her ambitions
frustrated, Borel remonstrated: “Few women are better placed than I 
to appreciate the cunning, often combined with treachery and persistence, employed by men to place obstacles in the path of those unfor93 Quoted in Maria Vérone, “Les femmes dans la magistrature,” L’oeuvre, Oct. 8, 1932.
94 Juliette Veillier-Duray, “Le droit au travail,” Bulletin de l’Association des françaises diplômées

des universités 15 (1934): 4–9.
95 Henri Rollet, preface to Lévy, Auxiliaires du tribunal, 6.
96 “L’association des femmes juristes,” La Française, Feb. 11, 1928; Odette Simon, “L’admission
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tunate women who stray from the beaten track.”98 In June 1930 Deputy
de Monzie floated a bill to bring gender equality to civil employment,
estimating that more than 300 women worked as lawyers in France and
another 140,000 as state functionaries.99 His efforts, however, were
unsuccessful.
	The inauguration of Léon Blum’s Popular Front cabinet in 1936,
and with it the appointment of three female ministers, was a propitious sign to feminists that they finally had allies inside the government
to facilitate their desired reforms.100 The attorney Marcelle KraemerBach hoped that the education undersecretary, Cécile Brunschvicg,
would use her position to reactivate the proposal to secure equality in
the judiciary. Brunschvicg, a founding member of the UFSF, was pessimistic. Earlier in the 1930s she had failed to persuade members of the
Radical Party to support a resolution designed to open all public offices
regardless of “class, sex, or opinion.”101 She feared that the antifeminists
would deploy arguments based on married women’s civil incapacity
to block any nomination of female judges. She thought compromises
were possible, and she planned to push a parliamentary commission
to accept women into the auxiliary staff of diplomatic offices.102 On
the question of women’s access to the judiciary, she was prepared only
to ask the justice minister for his acquiescence to permit unmarried
women into the juvenile courts to avoid a direct confrontation over
married women’s limited rights.103
	Subsequent parliamentary approaches to this issue were equally
cautious. In January 1937 the war veteran and republican-socialist
deputy Gabriel Delattre submitted a bill to give women entrée to the
secondary position of juge assesseur in the juvenile courts. This measure
would have permitted female lawyers with ten years’ experience to apply
for these secondary posts, or women aged twenty-five and older to sit
for the magistrates’ entrance exam. In his rationale Delattre argued:
98 Quoted in Simonton, History of European Women’s Work, 242. Borel first assumed a diplomatic role as the wife of the foreign affairs minister Georges Bidault. Formal equality in the foreign service nominally resulted from the decree of June 6, 1945. See Elodie Lejeune, “Un retour
aux normes? De Suzanne Borel à Madame Georges Bidault (1944–1953),” in Femmes et diplomatie:
France—XXe siècle, ed. Yves Denéchère (Brussels, 2004), 75–92.
99 “Une proposition de loi de M. de Monzie,” La Française, June 21, 1930.
100 On Cécile Brunschvicg, Suzanne Lacore, and Irène Joliot-Curie, see Sîan Reynolds,
“Women and the Popular Front in France: The Case of the Three Women Ministers,” French History
8 (1994): 196–224.
101 Cécile Brunschvicg, “De l’accession des femmes aux fonctions publiques,” La Française,
Nov. 5, 1932, quoted in Clark, Rise of Professional Women, 178.
102 Pierre Laval chaired the commission. See Cécile Brunschvicg, “Les femmes et la carrière diplomatique,” La Française, Mar. 7, 1936.
103 Cécile Brunschvicg, “Accès des femmes aux emplois de la fonction publique,” Centre
des Archives du Féminisme, Angers, unpublished MSS, 1 AF 479.
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“Women are already lawyers, and in this position they can suggest solutions to the juvenile court, and since their contributions are demonstrably generous, understanding, [and] productive, why then can’t they
be permitted to collaborate in the drawing up of a sentence, the repercussions of which have a profound effect on the spirit and soul of a
child?”104 The Committee on Civil and Criminal Legislation approved
one restrictive version of Delattre’s proposal that set a quota of two
women per court in Paris and one per court in the provinces.105 Mireille
Maroger, a criminal lawyer, endorsed this bill, insisting that women’s
innate maternal instincts made them infallible authorities on child welfare and claiming that women were better qualified than men to determine juvenile cases.106 Although Delattre’s proposal fell short of the
equality in principle that many feminists sought, Grinberg, for one, now
supported any reasonable means to put women into the courts to aid atrisk children. Like Maroger, Grinberg emphasized women’s distinctly
feminine qualities, declaring that women possessed “hearts more merciful” than men’s and “profound maternal instincts” that would save
the “disinherited children” of France if they were given opportunities
to judge. The approbation of female judges, she thought, would also
improve France’s status in the world by signaling a national commitment to the “fundamental principle of human justice.”107 Delattre’s proposal found approval at the committee level only and then faded from
the political register.108 Full consideration of the issue would ultimately
be delayed until after World War II and the liberation of France.
	The pursuit of equality under the Vichy regime was incompatible
with the authoritarian and repressive ideology of the new government.
The regime demonstrated its commitment to revitalizing the nation
through the family by restricting women’s rights and idealizing women’s
traditional role in the domestic sphere.109 Acting to strengthen the
patriarchal family, the law of October 11, 1940, curtailed women’s right
to work in civil service. The purging of women that followed was second
104 “Les femmes seront-elles juges-assesseurs dans les tribunaux pour enfants?” La Française, Jan. 23, 1937.
105 JO, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des députés, Jan. 14, 1937, 30; BMD, dossier Tribunaux
pour enfants.
106 Mireille Maroger, “Ce sont les mères qui devraient juger les enfants,” La Française, Nov.
13, 1937; Suzanne Normand, “Le souvenir de Mireille Maroger,” Marianne, Nov. 11, 1937. Maroger
was killed in a plane crash in Morocco in 1937 at the age of twenty-nine.
107 Suzanne Grinberg, “Oui, ce sont des femmes qui doivent juger les enfants,” Lundi, Jan.
18, 1937.
108 JO, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des députés, Jan. 14, 1937, 30.
109 See Miranda Pollard, Reign of Virtue: Mobilizing Gender in Vichy France, 1940–1944 (Chicago, 1998).
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only to the persecution of Jews in exclusionary impact.110 This discriminatory law targeting only women proved untenable and was suspended
after men were conscripted into the service du travail obligatoire (German
labor service) in 1942. Vichy officials also drafted, but did not enact, the
ordinance of July 27, 1942, that would have overhauled many features
of the juvenile courts, including eliminating the role for defense lawyers that had generated admiration for women in previous decades.111
The National Constituent Assembly
Given the importance of the historical relationship between women’s
political rights and judicial access, it is no accident that women’s admission to the bench occurred only after they were enfranchised. Frenchwomen acquired the right to vote by the decree of April 21, 1944, enacted
by Charles de Gaulle. That same year the attorney Andrée Lehmann,
Vérone’s protégée and the postwar leader of the LFDF, demanded that
the minister of justice, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, approve new legislation
to open judicial posts. To feminists’ dismay, the first bill introduced
in January 1945 proposed restricting women to the magistrature assise,
which would have meant excluding them from public prosecution and
other elite offices. This limited bill, sponsored by the deputy Robert
Lecourt, was sent to committee, where the deputy Germaine PoinsoChapuis, a Marseille attorney, did not let it reemerge without an overhaul. Concurrently, Poinso-Chapuis, the children’s court commission
chair Hélène Campinchi, and the socialist deputy Edouard Dupreux
pressured the justice minister for equitable access.112
While a comprehensive plan to reform the judiciary languished,
Campinchi, who was also an adviser to the justice commissioner, François de Menthon, drafted the February 1945 ordinance that modernized the TEA and opened posts to women. The promulgation of this
decree permitted women over thirty, and of French nationality, to serve
as juvenile magistrates. Addressing the plaguing problem of inadequate
staffing, a change was instituted to the tutelary structure: one judge
would now be assisted by two lay assessors, themselves experts in child
welfare, who would be nominated by the garde des sceaux.113 Campinchi hoped that this reform would stabilize the courts, increase judges’
110 Linda L. Clark, “Higher-Ranking Women Civil Servants and the Vichy Regime: Firings
and Hirings, Collaboration and Resistance,” French History 13 (1999): 332–59.
111 On the 1942 ordinance, see Sarah Fishman, “Progressive Change in an Authoritarian
Regime: Vichy’s Reforms,” in Battle for Children, 165–96.
112 Sylvie Chaperon, Les années Beauvoir (1945–1970) (Paris, 2000), 95–96.
113 JO, Ordonnances et décrets, Feb. 4, 1945, 530–34.

636

FRENCH HISTORICAL STUDIES

expertise, expand the range of rehabilitation measures, and mandate a
greater role for social workers.114 Poinso-Chapuis concluded that if the
state truly intended to aid vulnerable children, then women ought to
be put in control of the courts.115
	Legislation mandating equal access to all other judicial jurisdictions finally came before the Constituent Assembly on June 12, 1945. The
bill’s champions, Marianne Verger, Robert Pimienta, and Lecourt, who
were all recognized for their Resistance activities, argued that women
should be given equal treatment in honor of their wartime patriotism
and their persecution under the Nazis. They also celebrated women’s
accomplishments in teaching, scientific research, medicine, and journalism. Women seemed prepared for judicial decision making because
they could now evaluate evidence as jurors and represent the people
in the Constituent Assembly. The Radical deputy François Labrousse
rejected these evocations of women’s merits and called for their exclusion from the Cour de Cassation. Labrousse, who had opposed women’s
suffrage in 1922, insinuated that women were intellectually unfit for
“abstract law” and were suited only for the children’s courts. Most of his
colleagues were not persuaded. Unable to secure modifications to the
proposal, Labrousse stridently abstained from voting to signal his opposition. Remarkably, he carried fifty-four other delegates with him.116
These abstentions aside, the bill passed unanimously and became the
law of April 11, 1946, that permitted all male and female citizens to
apply for posts in the judiciary according to the same rules, whether
by the concours or by nomination. Progress was possible, to paraphrase
William Guéraiche, because the unity of the Resistance defeated the
resistance of the antifeminists.117
Tensions in the Postwar Period
The number of women entering the judiciary immediately after the
war was modest. Fewer than fifty women succeeded at the magistrates’
exam between 1946 and 1949, resulting in a female presence of between
12 and 22 percent of the total candidates annually.118 The pioneering
114 Hélène Campinchi, “La réforme des tribunaux pour enfants,” Le monde, Feb. 9, 1945.
115 Henriette Chandet, “Mme. Germaine Poinso-Chapuis: Députée des Bouches-du-
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cohort included Marguerite Haller and Charlotte Béquignon-Lagarde,
who both completed doctoral theses in the mid-1920s and then became
law professors. Haller began her new career by adjudicating war crimes
cases in the Tribunal Général du Gouvernement Militaire in the French
Zone of occupied Germany. Béquignon-Lagarde joined the Cour de
Cassation and continued her successes.119 The exceptional achievements of these women illustrate how powerfully discrimination had
constrained women’s opportunities.
	In this new era the grounds for women’s legal equality found new
security in the 1946 Constitution. Its preamble affirmed the equality of
the sexes under the law and guaranteed the right to work. Public policy
and social attitudes, however, continued to presume that women’s place
was primarily in the family. Feminists considered that vigilance was
required to stand against the forces inclined to return society to prewar
gender arrangements.120 The observant Moreau commented that the
law of April 11, 1946, “like all innovations, was disputed; one whispered
that certain people would want to restrain the application of the law to
permit women to serve only as judges in the juvenile courts.”121 Much
as Moreau had feared, members of the Federal Union of Judges (Union
Fédérale des Magistrats, or UFM) attempted to do just that when they
voted with near unanimity to bar women from the position of procureur
and to segregate them to the TEA.122 While this vote was nonbinding and impractical, it was an evident protest against the new gender
order.
	Two years later, in 1948, the UFM reinforced its threat of obstructionism by endorsing a decision by Paul Coste-Floret, then the minister
for overseas departments and territories, who had prevented Madame
Louys of Grenoble from sitting for the judiciary’s concours. Coste-Floret
had rejected Louys’s application, insisting on his ministerial authority
as the basis for denying her equal treatment. The Conseil d’Etat disagreed, ruling that Coste-Floret had abused his powers. That same year
the legislature clarified that women were, in fact, eligible to serve in the
supreme jurisdictions of the Conseil d’Etat and the Cour de Cassation,
as well as in more mundane offices such as notary, bailiff, and court
119 Marguerite Haller, La femme dans la magistrature: Cour d’appel de Douai; Audience solennelle de
rentrée du 16 septembre 1961 (Douai, 1961), 11. Béquignon-Lagarde received an honorary doctorate
from Smith College in 1949 (Who’s Who in France, 8th ed. [Paris, 1967], 786).
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clerk.123 Nevertheless, while those who studied the juvenile justice system called for seating at least one female judge in every court, the attitude toward women’s employment again soured.124
Disappointed by their defeat in the Louys case, UFM members predicted that when women eventually did find work as judges in the colonies, “it is France who will pay.”125 Such dark prophesies coincided with
the UFM’s contemptuous descriptions of female judges as “assailants”
who were decimating “our fortress.”126 Moreover, they insisted that one
legal weapon remained to keep women out of the judiciary that would
require an act of solidarity by men: the evocation of puissance marital
to prohibit their wives from working as judges. The law was on UFM’s
side. Regardless of the new Constitution and the Civil Code revisions of
1938 and 1943, a husband could still terminate his wife’s employment
for reasons of danger to her health or morality, of disruption to their
cohabitation, the housekeeping, or her maternal role.127
	The World War I veteran Robert Le Blant went farther by arguing
that resistance to female judges must be sustained regardless of the law.
At a professional assembly of the Court of Douai, Le Blant railed against
women’s employment as a destabilizing social force and hauled out
old prejudices against women’s intellectual capacity. His central point
was the same as the UFM’s, that a married woman made an unreliable
judge because of puissance marital, which he described as a “veritable
sword of Damocles that threatens to fall on the balances of Themis.”128
Indeed, feminists regretted that the Constitution had failed to override
a variety of vestigial legal inequalities that still limited married women’s
rights.129 This conflict between formal equality for women, on the one
hand, and the inequality for married women, on the other, prompted
Moreau to demand: “But when will we see matrimonial law adapted
to our Constitution and to the exigency of modern life? The legislature must act.”130 Despite the overall climate of economic recovery and
123 Marie-Thérèse Moreau, “A propos de quelques propositions de lois: La femme célibataire; La femme notaire,” L’union nationale des femmes 19 (1947): 3–4.
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128 Robert Le Blant, La loi du 11 avril 1946 et les possibilités de mariage entre magistrats: Cour
d’appel de Douai; Audience solennelle de rentrée du 2 octobre 1950 (Douai, 1950), 21–24.
129 Andrée Lehmann, Le 20e anniversaire de la Déclaration universel des droits de l’homme: Ce que
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growth, women’s rate of employment fell throughout the 1950s, and
the disapproval of married women’s paid employment continued.131
Although the contentiousness surrounding women and the judiciary in the colonial context merits a separate study, one example typifies the nature of the problem. Simone Gauillard (née Défix) passed the
magistrates’ exam in 1949 and sought a post in Dakar to join her spouse,
a civil servant. The colonial minister did not support the employment of
women in judicial functions and claimed that women were ill suited for
jobs in the colonies because the conditions were difficult and because
local traditions and religious beliefs were antithetical to accepting
female authority. Nevertheless, members of the FIFCJ and the CNFF
brought public pressure to bear on the ministry, and Gauillard finally
received a satisfactory job in 1955.132 The following year, however, the
tide turned against female judges in the colonies and territories. In the
context of colonial upheaval, in which France had already lost control
of Vietnam (1954) and was resisting the Algerian independence movement (1954–62), the Conseil d’Etat decided that all women could be
barred from overseas judgeships because some civil service posts might
require great physical strength or influence.133 During decolonization
adherence to traditional manifestations of power proved more important than the recognition of legal equality.
Conclusion
This exploration of tensions engendered by the efforts to bring women
into positions of authority in the judiciary leads to three conclusions.
First, this history demonstrates the power of the argument that without political emancipation, women could not become eligible for the
bench. If the judiciary was defined as a public office, by most measures
women needed their formal political independence to participate. The
law of 1900 that admitted women to the bar, but failed to make provisions for the expansion of professional rights, cast a long shadow over
the discussions. Nevertheless, exceptions to this rule coexisted alongside the prohibitions, notably in the commercial and labor courts.
Second, this research suggests that contemporaries concluded that
the exclusion of women from the juvenile court judiciary weakened
131 Sylvie Chaperon, “La radicalisation des mouvements féminins français de 1960 à 1970,”
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the efficacy of the courts. Although there was little disagreement that
women’s supposed natural maternal instincts qualified them to oversee
juveniles’ welfare, the juvenile courts before 1945 struggled to establish their methods and purpose.134 Since World War II  rehabilitation
therapies have superseded punitive measures, and the juvenile courts
have become feminized. Third, women’s right to judge was not granted
to acknowledge the equality of the sexes or to evoke women’s special
qualifications. Rather, this power was extended to recognize women’s
contribution to the Resistance and their suffering during the war and
Occupation. In the postwar period conservatives continued to apply
the brakes to progress; despite formal equality, men and women did
not occupy the same positions, fulfill the same specialties, or enjoy
equal status.135
At issue in this controversy were threats to corporate cohesion,
traditional definitions of professional identity and practice, and male
dominance in society. Whether or not women had a “right to judge”
was a contest suffused with questions about the future of gender relations and the social organization of the nation. Feminists had hoped
that if women’s entrance into the judiciary preceded the extension of
suffrage rights, then the bench would have provided a venue to demonstrate their aptitude as professionals and that this, in turn, would
have raised the perceived value of women in society. The limited range
of employment opportunities for women in the early twentieth century, along with the continued denial of suffrage after World War I,
was a compelling sign that France was not keeping abreast of contemporary democratic trends in other industrial societies. Feminists’ arguments for opening the judiciary to all women drew on the principle
of equality, and the possibility that substantive social benefit would
result from female judges’ unique skills. However, neither the ideological claims nor the pragmatic problems posed by vacant posts during
the interwar period proved sufficient to overcome traditional intransigence to changing the masculine judiciary.
Anxiety about the possibility of female judges prompted opponents
to emphasize the difficulty of the job, recall women’s legal disabilities,
and insist that only men would suffice. Those Frenchmen who resisted
equal political rights for women were also likely to reject advancing
134 Unfortunately, France suffered from increasing rates of juvenile crime throughout the
interwar years, and during World War II the situation worsened, until rates of criminality were
triple the prewar average. See Fishman, Battle for Children, 82–87.
135 In 2002 the proportion of women in the liberal professions and in the civil service had
risen to 36–38 percent, a significant increase from the 11–19 percent they had occupied in 1962.
See Margaret Maruani, Travail et emploi des femmes (Paris, 2003), 41–43.
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women’s employment opportunities. It was convenient for antifeminists to maintain that women’s ascension to the bench was premature
in advance of suffrage reform. In the contest over women’s access to the
judiciary, it is clear that the struggle was more political than practical.
As historians of women’s history have amply demonstrated, political
rights in France were fundamentally gendered in theory and application.136 The efforts to open the judiciary to women were met with a
degree of resistance indicative of the larger political and social questions at stake.

136 See, e.g., Christine Fauré, Democracy without Women: Feminism and the Rise of Liberal Individualism in France, trans. Claudia Gorbman and John Berks (Bloomington, IN, 1991). The recent
struggle for gender equality is addressed in Joan W. Scott, Parité! Sexual Equality and the Crisis of
French Universalism (Chicago, 2005).

